Article A Lesson for the Future: Will You Let Me Violate Your Privacy to Save Your Life? Khosro Salmani * and Brian Atuh Department of Mathematics and Computing, Faculty of Science and Technology, Mount Royal University, Calgary, AB T3E 6K6, Canada; batuh836@mtroyal.ca * Correspondence: ksalmani@mtroyal.ca Citation: Salmani, K.; Atuh, B. A Lesson for the Future: Will You Let Me Violate Your Privacy to Save Your Abstract: COVID-19 was an unprecedented pandemic that changed the lives of everyone. To handle the virus’s rapid spread, governments and big tech companies, such as Google and Apple, implemented Contact Tracing Applications (CTAs). However, the response by the public was different in each country. While some countries mandated downloading the application for their citizens, others made it optional, revealing contrasting patterns to the spread of COVID-19. In this study, in addition to investigating the privacy and security of the Canadian CTA, COVID Alert, we aim to disclose the public’s perception of these varying patterns. Additionally, if known of the results of other nations, would Canadians sacrifice their freedoms to prevent the spread of a future pandemic? Hence, a survey was conducted, gathering responses from 154 participants across Canada. Next, we questioned the participants regarding the COVID-19 pandemic and their knowledge and opinion of CTAs before presenting our findings regarding other countries. After showing our results, we then asked the participants their views of CTAs again. The arrangement of the preceding questions, the findings, and succeeding questions to identify whether Canadians’ opinions on CTAs would change, after presenting the proper evidence, were performed. Among all of our findings, there is a clear difference between before and after the findings regarding whether CTAs should be mandatory, with 34% of participants agreeing before and 56% agreeing afterward. This hints that all the public needed was information to decide whether or not to participate. In addition, this exposes the value of transparency and communication when persuading the public to collaborate. Finally, we offer three recommendations on how governments and health authorities can respond effectively in a future pandemic and increase the adoption rate for CTAs to save more lives. Life? J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3, 259–274. https://doi.org/10.3390/ Keywords: usable privacy; contact tracing apps (CTAs); data privacy and security jcp3020014 Academic Editors: Thomas Hupperich, Martin Degeling, Luis Javier García Villalba, Maryline 1. Introduction Laurent and Georgios Kambourakis COVID-19 hit Canada in Toronto on 25 January 2020, and it continued to spread and claim many lives. To slow down the spread of the virus, the Canadian government implemented several measures, such as mask mandates, social distancing, shields, limits on gatherings, COVID screening, and vaccinations. These measures were mandatory for businesses and citizens to follow. However, the personal usage of CTAs was optional. In other words, Canada’s approach to CTAs allowed for the decision to be left up to its citizens on whether to download the application. While only 16% of Canadians installed Canada’s national CTA, COVID Alert [1], studies show adoption rates of at least 60% For CTAs to be effective [2]. If only a minority downloads the application, positive COVID-19 cases can be missed, and other people within the vicinity during the same time window cannot be traced, which makes the app ineffective. As a result, CTAs were never effective as expected in Canada. It was not because of technical issues or poor development practices, but privacy concerns discouraged individuals from utilizing these technologies. These concerns became more pervasive when Received: 18 May 2023 Revised: 11 June 2023 Accepted: 12 June 2023 Published: 14 June 2023 Copyright: © 2023 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ 4.0/). J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3, 259–274. https://doi.org/10.3390/jcp3020014 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/jcp J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 260 many security experts raised security and privacy concerns over CTAs in May 2020 [3]. As this was the case in Canada and mostly in Western countries, a few other countries made it mandatory for citizens to download a CTA on their smartphones to track their geolocation and notify them when a positive case of COVID-19 is reported in their vicinity recently. Although this would violate the citizens’ rights to privacy, this approach would allow the health authorities to effectively monitor the spread and containment of the virus. For example, in South Korea, downloading the CTA was mandatory. Due to this and other forceful measures, the country has seen significantly fewer cases and deaths caused by COVID-19 than Canada. This comparison between the outcomes of COVID-19 in Canada and South Korea becomes much more staggering when we consider that South Korea has around 14 million more people (~35%) and a population density of 527 people per km2 compared to Canada’s four people per km2 . It then comes to the question that, if Canada made CTAs mandatory, would the cases and deaths have been similar to those of South Korea? Additionally, if citizens of Canada were aware of the positive influences that a CTA could introduce, would they have downloaded it to their smartphone and contributed to their country’s safety? To answer these questions, we surveyed the citizens of Canada to determine whether the lack of CTA participants was due to a lack of information. We conducted a study that focused on three main questions: what is your current knowledge of CTAs? Did you know that their implementation has effectively saved many lives in South Korea? Knowing this, would you use a CTA in a future pandemic? Moreover, we acquired the participants’ demographic information and concerns during the pandemic (no questions regarding personal losses or infections from COVID-19). Following the initial questions, we gathered the participants’ general experience with the pandemic. This involved if they were concerned for their wellbeing and the government’s handling of the situation. Additionally, we asked whether the participants had received at least one vaccination. This section determined any correlation between participants’ experience with the pandemic and their stance on CTAs. We then gathered the participants’ knowledge of CTAs. This focused on whether they were aware of their existence, specific applications they had heard of, and if they downloaded any. It is possible that, if the participant had not heard of CTAs or their usefulness, they would less likely be willing to participate. The next set of questions gathered the participants’ opinions of CTAs. This focused on if the participant believed in their importance in preventing the spread of a virus, their concerns when using the application, and if they would be open to sharing their personal information for contact tracing purposes. Next, we asked if they believed CTAs should be mandatory and whether or not they would trust governing agencies with their personal data. This was used to base the general public’s opinion of CTAs. This section’s results will be compared to the last section after we present the participants with our findings. After questioning the participants, we presented them with our findings (see Section 4) on South Korea’s handling of the pandemic and that their mandatory implementation of CTAs (as well as other mandatory measures) resulted in a significantly less infection and death toll than Canada. This section included graphical representations of the direct comparisons between Canada’s and South Korea’s COVID-19 cases and death tolls. Finally, we again questioned the participants’ opinions on CTAs to detect if there would be any deviations from their original stance. We asked if they would use a CTA in a future pandemic and if they would trust a government or a recognized third party with their personal information. We then asked again if the participant believed that, in a future pandemic, CTAs should be mandatory and if they would recommend their peers to download them. While previous studies [4–10] have examined the privacy and security aspects of contact tracing apps during the COVID-19 pandemic, our research aims to go beyond these investigations. In addition to evaluating the existing concerns, we place special emphasis on the impact of educating the public regarding these issues. Our research takes J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 261 a comprehensive approach by exploring the positive impact of educating the public about the benefits of these apps in halting the spread of viruses and reducing mortality rates in other countries. By highlighting success stories and demonstrating how contact tracing apps have been effective in curbing the transmission of infectious diseases, we aim to foster a deeper understanding among individuals about the potential of these apps in mitigating future pandemics. We believe that, by emphasizing the positive outcomes achieved through contact tracing apps, we can inspire and motivate the public to adopt and utilize these tools in future pandemic scenarios, further strengthening global efforts to prevent the rapid spread of infectious diseases and to minimize the associated health risks. This unique aspect of our research sets our work apart from previous studies. The main contributions of this work are as follows. 1. 2. 3. 4. First, we study and investigate the security and privacy techniques employed in Canada’s Contact Tracing Applications and assess the validity of the public privacy concerns about CTAs. We then compare Canada’s and South Korea’s COVID-19 restriction policies and protocols. We also provide a thorough demographic and environmental comparison that may influence and impact the number of COVID-19 cases, those hospitalized, and deaths across both countries. We conduct a survey gathering participants’ demographic information, opinions, and knowledge of CTAs before and after presenting our findings. We then conduct an in-depth analysis of the collected data from participants across Canada. We use this data collection and our findings to provide three suggestions\recommendations on how governments and health authorities can respond effectively in a future pandemic and increase the adoption rate for CTAs to save more lives. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the related work, and, in Section 3, we investigate the Canadian contact tracing application, COVID Alert. Section 4 studies and explains Canada’s performance during the COVID-19 pandemic and compares it with other countries, such as South Korea. Section 6 describes our methodology and presents our findings. We discuss our findings in more detail in Section 7 and provide three suggestions. Finally, Section 8 summarizes our conclusions. 2. Related Work This paper investigates the security and privacy of Canada’s CTAs and Canadians’ opinions on CTAs. Hence, in this section, we first briefly introduce the state-of-the-art CTA approaches. We then review related work that studies public opinion on contact tracing applications. 2.1. Contact Tracing Protocols and Applications In the last few years, several contact tracing applications have been developed to stop the spread of the coronavirus [4,9–11]. From the software architectural view, CTAs employ either “centralized” or “decentralized” architecture solutions. While centralized apps store anonymized data on a central server, decentralized apps keep the data on the users’ devices, providing more control over data. However, there is also a third model, the hybrid model, that benefits from both centralized and decentralized worlds [12,13]. In particular, DP-3T [13] is a decentralized privacy-preserving proximity tracing protocol designed by researchers from European institutes and universities. The protocol leverages Bluetooth technology and symmetric encryption techniques, such as SHA-256 and AES-128. The contact history logs are stored on the users’ devices and will not be transmitted to a central authority unless a user tests positive. TraceTogether was one of the first CTAs that was developed and released by Singapore’s government [12]. TraceTogether employs a privacy-preserving protocol called BlueTrace. BlueTrace adopts Bluetooth technology, in which devices exchange digital beacons (i.e., digital IDs) and store all encounters in their history logs. Although BlueTrace employs decentralized architecture, identifying and notifying the exposed individuals are performed J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 262 in a centralized center. Hence, BlueTrace is considered a hybrid protocol. Moreover, it leverages a symmetric key encryption scheme (AES-256-GCM) for efficiency considerations. Google and Apple [14] also made a joint effort to help health and government agencies to reduce the spread of the COVID-19 virus. Both companies agreed on a decentralized approach using Bluetooth technology. In their approach, users’ ephemeral IDs are stored on the users’ devices and are generated using AES-128 and HMAC-SHA-256. However, their introduced protocol is an Application Programming Interface (API) that can be leveraged by public health authorities to develop their own mobile applications. SwissCOVID app, Protect Scotland app, and Immune are just a few CTA examples that are developed using Apple and Google API in Swiss, Scotland, and Italy, respectively. Alipay Health Code is the CTA app that was developed in China. It leverages a centralized architecture and Global Positioning System (GPS) technology. The GPS-based system collects and stores individuals’ geographic locations on a 24/7 basis. South Korea also employed the centralized architecture to develop their contact tracing app, Corona 100 m (Co100). Besides GPS technology, the app uses government-collected data, such as surveillance camera footage and credit card transactions. The app alerts users when they are in a close vicinity, 100 m, of a location visited by an infected person. Thus far, 120 contact tracing applications have been developed worldwide [15]. Table 1 shows a short list of CTAs, including the employed technology and software architectures. Table 1. A short list of Contact Tracing Apps. Name Country Architecture Technology TraceTogether Singapore Hybrid Bluetooth Alipay Health China Centralized GPS Corona 100 m S. Korea Centralized GPS Hamagen Israel Decentralized GPS COVID Safe Australia Hybrid Bluetooth Stopp Corona Austria Decentralized Bluetooth COVID Watch USA Hybrid Bluetooth 2.2. Public Opinion on Contact Tracing Applications Although many contact tracing applications were implemented to facilitate and expedite the case investigation process, the adoption was considerably low. Studies [2] show that the adoption rate is a significant measure to contain the spread of COVID-19. However, several discouragements, including privacy and security risks, dissuaded individuals from utilizing these technologies. Li et al. [16] studied Americans’ willingness to install CTAs after informing them about primary CTAs’ architectural designs (e.g., centralized and decentralized). Contrary to previous studies, their results demonstrate that most participants preferred installing centralized CTAs apps. Furthermore, their results indicate that contact tracing apps that use a centralized architecture with solid security protection and provide users with other helpful information, such as hotspots of infection in public places, may achieve a high adoption rate in the U.S. O’Callaghan et al. [17] also conducted the same study in Ireland. They explored public opinion about the Irish CTA, “COVID Tracker”. The study shows a willingness to put up with a certain amount of inconvenience for the greater good. To improve adoption rate and usefulness, they suggest providing evidence and informing the public about the impact of contact tracing applications. Simko et al. [4] also studied public opinion regarding contact tracing applications in another study. They focused on the privacy aspect of the CTAs and ran a seven-month online survey. They argued that public opinion is largely stable over time, and users have J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 263 significant and diverse privacy concerns about CTAs. They suggest considering user values and concerns in the CTA development process to achieve a higher level of user cooperation. Kostka et al. [5] examines public perceptions and acceptance of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (CTAs) in China, Germany, and the United States. The study finds that acceptance rates vary among the countries, with China having the highest acceptance rate and Germany and the United States having lower rates. Factors influencing acceptance include perceived effectiveness of the apps, previous experience with CTAs and health apps, privacy concerns, and trust in the state. The study suggests that, while China’s high acceptance can be attributed to the mandatory nature of CTAs, acceptance in Germany and the US is influenced by the perceived usefulness and concerns about privacy and surveillance. Williams et al. [6] also believe that the CTA adoption rate is heavily influenced by moral reasoning. Their results indicated insufficient knowledge about contact tracing apps, and privacy concerns were the most significant reasons preventing individuals from adopting CTAs. Most of the conducted studies [4–8,18] show that privacy concerns and lack of knowledge about contact tracing apps were the primary reasons that discouraged individuals from adopting CTAs. 3. Canada’s Contact Tracing Application A few months after the beginning of the pandemic, most provinces in Canada acknowledged that the virus was here to stay. The first two years, however, have been a very different story, as each month garnered a new spike in COVID-19 cases and further restrictions to prevent its spread. One of these prevention methods was CTAs, which, although not widely adopted within Canada, did exist to lessen the spread of COVID-19. We now go into more detail on the methodology behind the Canadian CTA and its resourcefulness during the pandemic. Originally, contact tracing was conducted by a team of public health experts, tracking individuals that have been infected by the virus or have been in contact with those that have been infected. Automated CTAs attempt to replicate this by using geolocation to track an individual’s whereabouts while they were within public spaces while infected and using notifications to alert others to avoid these spaces. CTAs replace the intensive manual labor required to track millions of people. To accomplish this, however, they require the active participation of the majority of the population to effectively track those infected with the virus. “COVID Alert” is Canada’s contact tracing application that the federal government of Canada launched on 31 July 2020. Participation was voluntary, and the collection of personal data was governed by Canada’s Privacy Act [19]. The app leverages Bluetooth technology and employs Apple\Google API, which is a decentralized architecture. Each user receives and broadcasts randomly generated IDs from and to the other users within the user’s vicinity. Users who test positive for COVID-19 can anonymously notify other users of possible exposure. The app collects and stores randomly generated IDs on users’ phones for 14 days. In addition, IDs of other app users’ phones within a certain distance will also be stored to identify potentially infected users in the future. These random IDs are stored only on users’ phones and not with any governmental authorities. Moreover, the app does not collect or store data about a user’s identity, location, name, address, phone contact, or health information. All random IDs collected by COVID Alert are deleted after 14 days. In addition, users can delete the app from their phones and wait for 14 days until the data be automatically deleted. Users can also choose to delete the Exposure Logs manually [20]. Moreover, the user’s consent is required to disclose information about a positive COVID-19 case. Once the consent is collected, the COVID Alert app immediately notifies potentially exposed users. In other words, the app sends out alerts to users that have spent a minimum of fifteen minutes within a two-meter distance of an infected user. J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3, x FOR PEER REVIEW J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 6 of 17 264 users can delete the app from their phones and wait for 14 days until the data be automatically deleted. Users can also choose to delete the Exposure Logs manually [20]. Moreover, the user’s consent is required to disclose information about a positive COVID-19 case.COVID Once theAlert consenthas is collected, the COVID Alert app immediately notifies However, been downloaded about 6.86 million times and reported potentially exposed users. In other words, the app sends out alerts to users that have spent about 57 thousand cases [1], which are about 18 percent of Canada’s population and less a minimum of fifteen minutes within a two-meter distance of an infected user. than 2 However, percent of totalAlert positive COVID-19 cases in6.86 Canada. COVID has been downloaded about million times and reported about 57 thousand cases [1], which are about 18 percent of Canada’s population and less 4. Canada’s COVID-19 Performance than 2 percent of total positive COVID-19 cases in Canada. The first known COVID-19 case in Canada was diagnosed in Ontario province on 25 January 2020 [20]. Since the pandemic’s start, 4.4 million COVID-19 cases and 47,087 deaths The first known COVID-19 case in Canada was diagnosed in Ontario province on 25 have been2020 reported in Canada. In addition, more than 63 million 93 million doses January [20]. Since the pandemic’s start, 4.4 million COVID-19 casestests and and 47,087 of vaccine have administrated to this moment. deaths have beenbeen reported in Canada. In up addition, more than 63 million tests and 93 million doses of vaccine have been administrated upas to this moment. Italy, the United Kingdom, and Compared to other countries, such Germany, to other countries,better such asinGermany, Italy, theFor United Kingdom, and France,Compared Canada has performed many criteria. example, Canada’s cumulative France, Canada has performed better in many criteria. For example, Canada’s cumulative per-capita rate of COVID-19 cases was less than half of cases in Italy and approximately per-capita rate of COVID-19 cases was less than half of cases in Italy and approximately one-third casesin in United Kingdom (see Figure 1). more than eighty one-thirdof of cases thethe United Kingdom (see Figure 1). Moreover, moreMoreover, than eighty percent ofof Canadians werewere fully vaccinated by March 2022, while it2022, was considerably lessconsiderably in percent Canadians fully vaccinated by March while it was less other countries, such as the Kingdom, United States, and Germany (see Germany Figure 2). (see Figure 2). in other countries, such asUnited the United Kingdom, United States, and COVID-19 cases per-capita COVID-19 cases per-capita 4. Canada’s COVID-19 Performance 7 of 17 Figure 1.1. Cumulative per-capita of COVID-19 cases. Datafrom were extracted Figure Cumulative per-capita rate of rate COVID-19 cases. Data were extracted a publicly avail- from a publicly able source (Our World in Data) [21]. available source (Our World in Data) [21]. Vaccinated people (%) J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3, x FOR PEER REVIEW Figure Vaccinated People. Dataextracted were extracted fromavailable a publicly available source (Our World Figure2.2.Fully Fully Vaccinated People. Data were from a publicly source (Our World in Data)[21]. [21]. in Data) However, Canada’s performance, especially during the first and second waves, was However, Canada’s performance, especially during the first and second waves, was not as good as in a few other countries, such as South Korea. For example, the first COVIDnot19as good as inKorea a few other countries, such as2020. South example, case in South was diagnosed on 20 January On 1Korea. March, For South Korea hadthe first COVID19 the casehighest in South Korea was diagnosed on 20 January 2020. Onamong 1 March, number of COVID-19 cases, with 3736 confirmed cases, otherSouth peer Korea had the countries, such asof Canada, which only hadwith 38 cases then. However, everything completely highest number COVID-19 cases, 3736 confirmed cases, among other peer countries, changed at the end of the same month, 31 March. The number of COVID-19 cases in South such as Canada, which only had 38 cases then. However, everything completely changed Korea became the lowest, with 9786 positive cases among the peer countries, such as at France, the end of 52,229, the same month,with 31 10,711 March. The number of COVID-19 cases with and Canada, COVID-19 cases. Table 2 provides more de- in South Korea became the lowest, with 9786 positive casescases among thepeer peercountries countries, such tails about the number of confirmed COVID-19 among in our re- as France, with search.and Canada, with 10,711 COVID-19 cases. Table 2 provides more details about the 52,229, number of confirmed COVID-19 cases among peer countries in our research. Table 2. The number of confirmed COVID-19 cases among peer countries in our research. Country Canada S. Korea The U.S. First Case 25 January 20 January 20 January # Cases 1 March–31 March 38–10,711 3737–9786 32–192,079 J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 265 Table 2. The number of confirmed COVID-19 cases among peer countries in our research. Country First Case # Cases 1 March–31 March Canada S. Korea The U.S. Germany France The U.K. 25 January 20 January 20 January 27 January 24 January 29 January 38–10,711 3737–9786 32–192,079 117–61,913 130–52,229 94–38,484 In this study, we also considered that many other factors, such as population, population density, size of the vulnerable population, and strength of the healthcare system, play a significant role in confining and eradicating the virus [22]. Hence, in the next step, we studied and investigated these factors between Canada and South Korea. Compared with South Korea, the population of Canada is about 27% smaller. Moreover, South Korea’s population density is more than 100 times bigger than Canada’s. Even the most densely populated city in South Korea, Seoul, is about three times bigger than the most densely populated city in Canada, Vancouver. Table 3 shows our findings in more detail. Table 3. Comparing the population between Canada and South Korea. Factor Canada South Korea Population Population density (/Km2 ) Senior population (>65) Children Population (<10) 38,929,902 4 ~7,000,000 3,943,791 51,373,705 527 ~9,000,000 ~3,998,100 Considering this data, Canada should have performed much better than South Korea; however, as we demonstrated in Table 2, that was not the case. As a result, 47,661 Canadians have died since the beginning of COVID-19, while 29,925 deaths have been reported in South Korea. This means that, if we only consider the population size and ignore other factors, such as population density and vulnerable population, Canada could have experienced 12,869 fewer deaths (27%) if Canada had applied the same policies and protocols that South Korea employed. Note that this number increases when we consider the other factors shown in Table 3 (e.g., more lives could have been saved). Hence, in the next section, we study and compare safety policies and protocols employed in Canada and South Korea to find the reasons that caused this significant difference in the number of confirmed cases and deaths between these two countries. Comparing COVID-19 and Health Policies between Canada and South Korea Public health in Canada consists of three oversight levels—federal, provincial, and regional. While the federal government provides healthcare funding for the territories and provinces, Canadian constitute grants jurisdiction to the provincial governments over the administration and delivery of health care services [23]. During the pandemic, all federal, provincial, and regional sections worked closely to implement the required health services, such as contact tracing and testing. In addition, they set policies and recommendations, such as social distancing. Closing schools, universities, nonessential businesses, and public playgrounds were among the very first steps that the provincial governments took in March 2020 to help the pandemic. The federal government also limited the incoming international flights and eventually closed the borders, including the land border with the US. Later, the COVID Alert app was released. In the beginning, wearing masks were recommended, and then it became mandated. Many provinces established drive-through COVID-19 testing centers that were carrying out thousands of tests in a single day. Potentially infected individuals who were in contact with a patient were being traced and contacted to be tested. A 14-day J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 266 self-quarantine and isolation plan was put in place to prevent the introduction and spread of the virus. Similar to many other countries, South Korea also employed a three-step protocol that includes testing, tracing, and isolating to confine and eventually eradicate the spread of the deadly virus. However, contrary to other courtiers, South Korea implemented the most elaborate contact tracing program [24]. Following the MERS outbreak in 2015, which drastically impacted South Korea’s citizens and economy [25], lawmakers reinforced new laws and privacy acts to contain epidemics. In a case of an emergency, authorities are permitted to access and analyze significant types of information, including facility visit records (e.g., pharmacies and medical facilities), cellular GPS data from cell phones, credit card transaction logs, and closed-circuit television [26]. This allowed the public health authorities to effectively and quickly trace and contact the potentially infected citizens, which helped to prevent the further transmission of COVID-19. Moreover, the government’s website published information about all new infection cases to inform people. South Korea’s deep and elaborate digital contact tracing program was highly effective and certainly contributed to Korea’s effective control of the early spread of the virus [27]. The golden time to respond to an epidemic is the first few weeks, and as it is shown during the last COVID-19 outbreak in South Korea, the digital contact tracing program plays a vital role in managing and controlling the epidemic. Note that once the information is analyzed and the results are provided, proper actions should be taken to achieve the desired goal. For example, COVID-19 tests should be carried out for the potential infected individuals. Since Canada performed very well in this area, we did not place this factor (e.g., having J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3, x FOR PEER REVIEW of 17 sufficient testing kits and professionals) among Canada’s weak 9points. Figure 3 shows the number of COVID-19 tests administered during the pandemic. Tests performed (a) (b) Figure 3. (a). Cumulative COVID-19 tests per 1000 people [21]. (b). Cumulative COVID-19 tests [21]. Figure 3. (a). Cumulative COVID-19 tests per 1000 people [21]. (b). Cumulative COVID-19 tests [21]. Hence, employing an elaborate digital contact tracing program was one of the biggest, if not the biggest, differences between Canada’s and South Korea’s COVID-19 action plan. This is an important factor that has also been studied recently in the UK [28], which confirms our point about the importance of digital contact tracing. This study estimates several hundred thousand infections were prevented by widely adopting the NHS J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 267 Hence, employing an elaborate digital contact tracing program was one of the biggest, if not the biggest, differences between Canada’s and South Korea’s COVID-19 action plan. This is an important factor that has also been studied recently in the UK [28], which confirms our point about the importance of digital contact tracing. This study estimates several hundred thousand infections were prevented by widely adopting the NHS COVID-19 app [28]. Note that Canada was in a better condition in every other aspect, from the population size to the number of carried out tests, except in adopting digital contact tracing. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that South Kore’s digital contact tracing program would prove acceptable in countries, such as Canada, where people are profoundly concerned about the privacy threats of IoT devices and software applications. The only solution is encouraging individuals to install contact tracing apps voluntarily. However, as we discussed, this requires at least a 60% adoption rate. To achieve this goal, public awareness plays a vital role. Hence, in the next part of our study, we conducted a survey to investigate public opinion about CTAs and whether informing people would encourage them to install and use a CTA voluntarily. 5. Methodology To collect a rich set of data gathering the public’s opinion regarding CTAs, we constructed an approximately 15-min survey, including both multiple-choice and free-answer questions. The survey was deployed through Google Forms and manually distributed to Canadians online. Our survey was approved by the Office of Research Services and the Office of Research Ethics at Mount Royal University, was anonymous, and all questions were optional, except the one for retrieving consent. In addition, a participant could provide their email to receive an optional Everything Card, valued at $10. 5.1. Survey Protocol Due to the low adoption rate of CTAs, we designed this survey for both those who have heard of them and those who have not. We purposely avoided any personal questions regarding the participants’ experience with COVID-19 to maintain focus on CTAs, rather than personal losses. The survey was designed to gather the participants’ opinions before and after presenting them with findings regarding positive results from CTAs, as well as whether they would change as a result. The survey had the following main sections to gradually focus on the main topic before presenting the findings, then it reiterated some questions to fully grasp the participants’ opinions on CTAs. Demographics. First, we asked the participants general demographic questions, such as age range, gender, the highest level of education, and province or territory within Canada. We hypothesized that these questions might correlate with participants’ attitudes toward COVID-19 and CTAs. Questions related to COVID-19. The questions focused more on the participants’ experience and following of COVID-19, avoiding any details, such as infections and deaths. This section provided a deeper insight into how the participants’ attitudes toward the pandemic could influence their stance on CTAs. It begins with their concern for their wellbeing during the pandemic, how closely they followed the infection rates and death toll, and how well they believed the government handled the pandemic. The last question asked whether the participant received at least one vaccination to discover relationships between their personal choices and opinions. All questions, excluding the vaccination one, were a five-point Likert scale designed to avoid constraining the participant to a simple yes or no. Knowledge of Contact Tracing Applications. This section was added to discover whether the participants’ opinions on CTAs were due to a lack of knowledge about them. The first question asked if the participant regularly used their smartphone, and if they did not would be a critical factor for why they did not participate in contact tracing, as they are exclusive to such devices. We then continued with specific questions regarding CTAs and the participants’ knowledge of their existence. First was whether they were familiar with CTAs used for the COVID-19 pandemic. The second was if they were familiar J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 268 with COVID Alert and/or ABTraceTogether, the two Canadian CTAs, the latter being the Alberta-specific app. Lastly, we asked whether they downloaded either application, giving us an idea of the participants’ overall adoption rate. Opinion of Contact Tracing Applications. The questions were added to gather a deeper insight into the participants’ stances and concerns regarding CTAs. First, to collect their opinion directly, we asked if the participant believed CTAs were important in slowing the spread of COVID-19. Next, we asked if the participant was concerned for their privacy when using a CTA. This would gather if sharing personal information was a deciding factor when choosing whether or not to opt-in to the application. Following this, we asked if they did not mind sharing some of their information for contact tracing purposes. This would create a link between why, although participants were concerned for their privacy, they still opted in to download a CPA. Next, we asked if the government should remove the choice to download CPAs and make them mandatory for all citizens. Finally, we asked if they trust the government or a private company to collect their geolocation data to help with the COVID-19 pandemic. The combination of these questions gathers the complex situation that the pandemic and CTAs put us in. Although we wish to help the general public, our privacy is important. Findings of COVID-19 Contact Tracing. In this section, there were no questions, just graphs and statements, outlining the significant findings regarding the successful implementation of CTAs within South Korea. The major findings were that, although South Korean citizens’ privacy was being breached using CTAs and other tracking methods, they successfully managed to keep their death toll and infection rates far below Canada’s, despite having a larger population and population density. Opinions of Contact Tracing Applications. In this section, we reiterated our previous questions to gather whether the participants’ opinions on CTAs would change after seeing the results of our findings. First, we asked if they would opt-in to using a CTA in a potential future pandemic. Next, we asked if they would opt-in to sharing their geolocation data for contact tracing purposes and if they believed they should be mandatory during a possible future pandemic. Finally, we asked the participants whether they would recommend CTAs to others now knowing the information they do. This section also gathers whether the transparent sharing of information to the population could help prevent a slow uptake in CTAs should a future pandemic arise. 5.2. Recruitment We created a poster, an email template, and an online post template for recruiting participants for our study. We initially sent the poster and emails directly to residents outside Alberta to gather participants outside our province. This was performed to ensure we gathered enough data from a diverse demographic before we targeted those we knew within Alberta. Once we felt that strategy had limited its effectiveness, we then sent our poster and email to people in different age groups in our social circles. Following this, we attempted to use social media groups associated with other provinces in Canada to broaden our geographic reach. Unfortunately, this did not garner any results, as surveys are forbidden within these sites. Following this, we used a social media group associated with Mount Royal University, which provided us with the required number of participants to complete this study. 5.3. Analysis A base analysis was performed for each question to dictate common trends, majorities, minorities, and averages. Next, an analysis was conducted on the data collected from the survey that referenced participants’ answers before and after the presentation of our findings. These references and their differences were indicators of whether the participants’ opinions changed due to the information provided. Similar questions were used before and after the findings so as to be used for this phase of analysis, and, in addition, other questions were used to indicate a change in opinions. J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 269 6. Results In this section, we present the results of our study, conducted from 1 September 2021 to May 2022, where we gathered the responses of 154 participants for our research. From 1 September to 31 December, we conducted our preliminary phase, where we developed the questions for the survey and gathered the findings we would present to the participants. Moreover, during the initial phase, we requested and received the Human Research J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3, x FOR PEER REVIEW 12 of 17 Ethics approval and Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans certifications required to conduct this study. From 1 January to 31 January, we prepared promotional materials for the study, such as posters, email templates, and online posts. Additionally, designed theAt survey using Google Forms, and we finalized using all available outletswe at our disposal. the end of May, we successfully gathered the the method we will be issuing for the optional $10 consolation to the participants. From required number of participants to complete the study. We then analyzed the survey re1 February theresults end ofwe May, began running our study with participants, advertising sults to findtothe willwe now report. using all available outlets at our disposal. At the end of May, we successfully gathered It is important to acknowledge the limitations of our study. Firstly, our research was the required number of participants to complete the study. We then analyzed the survey conducted with a specific focus on Canadians, limiting the generalizability of our findings results to find the results we will now report. to a broader international context. Furthermore, our participant pool was predominantly It is important to acknowledge the limitations of our study. Firstly, our research was drawn from Western Canada, with a specific concentration in the province of Alberta. This conducted with a specific focus on Canadians, limiting the generalizability of our findings regional bias may affect the diversity and representativeness of our sample, potentially to a broader international context. Furthermore, our participant pool was predominantly influencing the outcomes and conclusions of our research. Future studies should aim to drawn from Western Canada, with a specific concentration in the province of Alberta. This include a more diverse and geographically varied participant pool to obtain a comprehenregional bias may affect the diversity and representativeness of our sample, potentially sive understanding of the impact of public education on contact tracing appshould adoption. influencing the outcomes and conclusions of our research. Future studies aim By to addressing these limitations, future research can provide a more comprehensive perspecinclude a more diverse and geographically varied participant pool to obtain a comprehentive the effectiveness of impact educational initiatives in encouraging the useapp of contact tracing siveon understanding of the of public education on contact tracing adoption. By apps during pandemics on a global scale. addressing these limitations, future research can provide a more comprehensive perspective on the effectiveness of educational initiatives in encouraging the use of contact tracing apps 6.1. Demographic during pandemics on a global scale. The majority of participants that completed the survey were relatively young, iden6.1. Demographic tifying as a person between the ages of 18 and 29 (64.3%). This was likely due to us using The majority of participants completed the survey were relatively young, identithe Mount Royal University socialthat media group to gather our remaining participants. Adfying as a person between of 18 and were 29 (64.3%). This was likely due tolikely us using ditionally, the majority ofthe ourages participants Alberta residents (57.2%), duethe to Mount Royal University social media group to42.2% gatherofour participants. the same reason as the age range. Moreover, theremaining participants identified Addithemtionally, majority of our participants were residents (57.2%),this likely due to (see the selves as the “Male,” 55.8% as “Female,” and 2% Alberta preferred not to answer question same reason Figure 4). as the age range. Moreover, 42.2% of the participants identified themselves as “Male,” 55.8% as “Female,” and 2% preferred not to answer this question (see Figure 4). (a) (b) Figure Figure 4. 4. (a) (a) Gender Gender demographic. demographic. (b) Age demographic. 6.2. Change Change in in Opinion Opinion of of Contact Contact Tracing Tracing Applications 6.2. Applications A change in opinion regarding CTA mandates before and after presenting A change in opinion regarding CTA mandateswas wasdetected detected before and after presentour findings to the participants. Before the presentation of our findings regarding South ing our findings to the participants. Before the presentation of our findings regarding Korea’s positive results utilizing CTAs, the results to the question regarding whether South Korea’s positive results utilizing CTAs, the results to the question regarding Contact Tracing Applications be mandatory or not, 34% of participants agreed, 45.7% whether Contact Tracing Applications be mandatory or not, 34% of participants agreed, disagreed, and 20.3% neither agreed nor disagreed (see Figure 5). After presenting our 45.7% disagreed, and 20.3% neither agreed nor disagreed (see Figure 5). After presenting findings, however, the overall stance of participants changed, and 55.8% agreed, 29.9% our findings, however, the overall stance of participants changed, and 55.8% agreed, 29.9% disagreed, and 14.3% neither agreed nor disagreed. This sudden change in perspective can most likely be attributed to the presentation of our findings, where before, the majority disagreed that CTAs should be mandatory, and after, the majority agreed that CTAs should be mandatory. J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 270 disagreed, and 14.3% neither agreed nor disagreed. This sudden change in perspective can most likely be attributed to the presentation of our findings, where before, the majority J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3, x FOR PEER REVIEW 13 of 17 J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3, x FOR PEER REVIEW 13 of 17 disagreed that CTAs should be mandatory, and after, the majority agreed that CTAs should be mandatory. Should Should Contact Contact Tracing Tracing Apps Apps be be Mandatory? Mandatory? Disagree Disagree Strongly disagree Strongly disagree Neither agree nor disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Agree Strongly agree Strongly agree After After Before Before 60.00% 60.00% 40.00% 40.00% 20.00% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 40.00% 40.00% 60.00% 60.00% Figure 5. Before and after results regarding CTA mandates. Figure 5. 5. Before Before and and after after results results regarding regarding CTA CTAmandates. mandates. Figure When comparing the general general response response to to the the opinionated When When comparing comparing the opinionated questions questions regarding regarding CTAs, CTAs, there is a drastic shift from mixed and negative to positive (see Figures 6 and 7). Since the there is a drastic shift from mixed and negative to positive (see Figures 6 and 7). Since there drastic shift from mixed and negative to positive (see Figures 6 and 7). Since the questions are the with minor changes, this in on the questions are generally the same, minor changes, this switch in perspectives on questions are generally generally the same, same, withwith minor changes, this switch switch in perspectives perspectives on CTAs CTAs can attributed to of from South Korea. Another inCTAs can be only be attributed the presentation of findings the findings South Korea. Another can only only be attributed to the thetopresentation presentation of the the findings fromfrom South Korea. Another interesting finding is that before presenting our findings, most participants believed CTAs interesting findingisisthat thatbefore beforepresenting presentingour our findings, findings, most most participants believed CTAs teresting finding CTAs are essential to slow down the spread of COVID-19 (61%), and only 34% agreed that they are are essential essential to to slow slow down down the the spread spread of of COVID-19 COVID-19 (61%), (61%), and and only only 34% 34% agreed agreed that that they they should be mandatory. This reveals that, although participants know that lives could be should be mandatory. This reveals that, although participants know that lives could should be mandatory. This reveals that, although participants know that lives could be be saved by using CTAs, they are unwilling or unable to give up their right to choose whether saved by using CTAs, they are unwilling or unable to give up their right to choose whether saved by using CTAs, they are unwilling or unable to give up their right to choose whether or not to download them. South Korea, or Following the the presentation presentation of of our our findings findings on on South or not not to to download download them. them. Following Following the presentation of our findings on South Korea, Korea, however, the contradiction no longer exists, as the majority of participants agreed that however, however, the the contradiction contradiction no longer longer exists, exists, as the the majority majority of of participants participants agreed agreed that that CTAs should be mandatory. CTAs should be mandatory. CTAs should be mandatory. Sharing Sharing perosnal perosnal informnation informnation and and Privacy Privacy Concerns Concerns Disagree Disagree Strongly disagree Strongly disagree Neither agree nor disagree Neither agree nor disagree Agree Agree Strongly agree Strongly agree BB AA 40.00% 40.00% 20.00% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 40.00% 40.00% 60.00% 60.00% 80.00% 80.00% Figure 6. 6. Participants’ opinions opinions before the the presentation of of findings. (A) (A) “I don’t don’t mind sharing sharing some Figure Figure 6. Participants’ Participants’ opinions before before the presentation presentation of findings. findings. (A) “I “I don’t mind mind sharing some some of my my information information for for contact contact tracing tracing purposes”. purposes”. (B) (B) “I “I am am concerned concerned for for my my privacy privacy when when using using a of of my information for contact tracing purposes”. (B) “I am concerned for my privacy when using aa contact tracing tracing app”. contact contact tracing app”. app”. Following the presentation of our findings, when the participants were asked if they Following Following the the presentation presentation of of our our findings, findings, when when the the participants participants were were asked asked if if they they would share their geolocation data with trusted party or government during potential would would share share their their geolocation geolocation data data with with aaa trusted trusted party party or or government government during during aaa potential potential future pandemic, 72.1% agreed (see Figure 7). future future pandemic, pandemic, 72.1% 72.1% agreed agreed (see (see Figure Figure7). 7). J.J.J.Cybersecur. Cybersecur.Priv. Priv.2023, 2023,33, 3, xx FOR FOR PEER PEER REVIEW REVIEW Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 271 14 of of 17 17 14 Recommending CTAs to Others and Sharing Geolocation Data Disagree Disagree Strongly disagree disagree Strongly Neither agree agree nor nor disagree disagree Neither Agree Agree Strongly agree agree Strongly BB AA 40.00% 40.00% 20.00% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 40.00% 40.00% 60.00% 60.00% 80.00% 80.00% Figure 7. 7. Participants’ Participants’ opinions after the presentation of findings. findings. (A) “I “I wouldn’t wouldn’t mindmind sharing my Figure Participants’opinions opinionsafter after the presentation of findings. (A) “I wouldn’t sharing Figure the presentation of (A) mind sharing my geolocation data with a trusted party or government to prevent the spreading of the virus and save geolocation datadata withwith a trusted partyparty or government to prevent the spreading of the of virus save my geolocation a trusted or government to prevent the spreading theand virus and more lives”. lives”. (B) (B) “I “I would would advise advise others others to to download download the the contact contact tracing tracing app app by by sharing sharing this this inforinformore save more lives”. (B) “I would advise others to download the contact tracing app by sharing this mation”. mation”. information”. 6.3. Trust Trust with with Personal Personal Information Information 6.3. 6.3. Information A recent recentstudy study[29] [29]shows showsthat thatUS UScitizens citizensare are more likely to trust traditional intuirecent study [29] shows that US citizens are more likely trust traditional intuiA more likely to to trust traditional intuitions tions than government agencies. Moreover, the survey results show that Americans have tions than government agencies. Moreover, the survey results show that Americans have than government agencies. Moreover, the survey results show that Americans have far less far less trust in big tech companies. Hence, we investigated Canadians’ opinions about far less trusttech in big tech companies. we investigated Canadians’ opinions about trust in big companies. Hence, Hence, we investigated Canadians’ opinions about storing storing their personal personal data on on third-party third-party or government government servers. Therefore, Therefore, before preprestoring their data or servers. before their personal data on third-party or government servers. Therefore, before presenting our senting our results, we asked participants if they trust the government using their geolosenting we ourasked results, we asked participants they trust the government using their data geoloresults, participants if they trust if the government using their geolocation for cation data for forand the 49.9% pandemic, and 49.9% agreed. Onwhen the other other hand, when when participants cation data the pandemic, and 49.9% agreed. On the hand, the pandemic, agreed. On the other hand, participants wereparticipants asked if they were aasked asked if they they trust aawith private company withfor their geolocation for the pandemic, the were if trust private company with their pandemic, trust private company their geolocation thegeolocation pandemic,for thethe response wasthe less response was was lessonly favorable, where only 31.8% agreed (see Figure 8). This This showspandemic, that, in in aa response less favorable, (see Figure 8). shows that, favorable, where 31.8%where agreedonly (see31.8% Figureagreed 8). This shows that, in a future future pandemic, pandemic, Canadians will mostwith likelya comply comply with aa CTA CTA administrated administrated and mainmainfuture Canadians most likely with and Canadians will most likely will comply CTA administrated and maintained by the tained by the government. Note that 72.1% agreed to share their geolocation data with the tained by the government. Note that 72.1% agreed to share their geolocation data with the government. Note that 72.1% agreed to share their geolocation data with the government government following the presentation of our findings (see Figure 7). government the presentation of our (see Figure 7). following thefollowing presentation of our findings (seefindings Figure 7). Sharing Personal Data with Government and Third-parties Disagree Disagree Stronglyy disagree disagree Strongl Neither agree agree nor nor disagree disagree Neither Agree Agree Stronglyy agree agree Strongl B A 60.00% 60.00% 40.00% 40.00% 20.00% 20.00% 0.00% 0.00% 20.00% 20.00% 40.00% 40.00% 60.00% 60.00% Figure 8. 8. Participants’ Participants’ opinions about sharing theirtheir datadata withwith the government government and third-party third-party comFigure opinions about sharing their data with the and comFigure Participants’ opinions about sharing the government and third-party panies. (A) (A) “I “I trust trust the the government government to to collect collect my my geolocation geolocation data”. data”. (B) (B) “I “I trust trust aa private private company company panies. companies. (A) “I trust the government to collect my geolocation data”. (B) “I trust a private to collect collect my my geolocation geolocation data”. data”. to company to collect my geolocation data”. 7. Discussion Discussion and and Suggestions Suggestions 7. 7. Suggestions In this study, in addition addition to to investigating investigating the the privacy and security ofofthe the Canadian In this study, in investigating theprivacy privacyand andsecurity securityof theCanadian Canadian CTA, we aim to investigate and disclose the public’s perception of contact tracing apps CTA, we we aim aimto toinvestigate investigateand anddisclose disclosethe thepublic’s public’s perception contact tracing apps CTA, perception of of contact tracing apps and and their most significant concerns that prevent individuals from adopting and utilizing and their significant concerns that prevent individuals adopting utilizing their mostmost significant concerns that prevent individuals fromfrom adopting and and utilizing these these apps. apps. Hence, Hence, besides the questions questions discussed inprevious the previous previous sections, we devoted devoted these besides the discussed the sections, we apps. Hence, besides the questions discussed in thein sections, we devoted some some questions questions to users’ users’ concerns during the pandemic. pandemic. some to concerns during the questions to users’ concerns during the pandemic. J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 272 Our study demonstrates that more than 95% of the participants had received at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine. We asked this question to discover relationships between their personal choices and opinions. Furthermore, more than 73% (45.4% agreed and 27.9% strongly agreed) of the participants were highly concerned about their wellbeing. Moreover, more than 65% (44.1% agreed, 21.1% strongly agreed) followed the COVID-19 instructions, infection rates, and death toll closely. Considering the provided statistics, to our surprise, about 40% of the participants indicated that they had NEVER heard about COVID-Alert, the Canadian CTA, before participating in our study. This could be one of the factors that drastically impact the effectiveness of a potential contact tracing application. Recall that, in Section 1, we discussed that an adoption rate of at least 60% is required For CTAs to be effective [2], and considering that about 40% of the participants had not heard about it before will make the 60% adoption rate goal an even more difficult objective to achieve. Moreover, about 55% of the participants indicated they were concerned about their privacy if they wanted to use a contact tracing app. As a result, about 50% of the participants indicated that they never used or installed any type of CTAs on their personal devices, such as cell phones. Suggestions Based on our study’s results and findings, we derived the following suggestions that help the governments, especially the government of Canada and health authorities, to better handle, manage, and administer a future pandemic. First, our study showed the impact and importance of digital contact tracing in decreasing the spread of infection. Hence, even though contact tracing applications were unsuccessful in their first appearance during the COVID-19, we believe they should be employed again in a future pandemic. However, continuous research and work should be performed to improve the security level and to address privacy concerns. Second, to achieve the at least 60% adoption rate, the public should be informed about the advantages and benefits of employing digital contact tracing apps. Our study demonstrates how this can positively change public perception towards utilizing these new technologies, such as CTAs, to stop a future pandemic. However, this process requires precise planning and should be an ongoing process over time. Therefore, people become ready to do their part when the next pandemic hits. Third, in a future pandemic, CTAs should be administrated and maintained by the government rather than third-party companies. On the other hand, the government must re-design and improves the CTAs’ privacy statements to address public concerns. For example, what data will be collected? Where will the data be collected (e.g., in a public area)? Where and how long will the data be stored? What security measures are employed to protect the data? These are just a few of many questions that should be explicitly discussed and answered to positively change public perception. 8. Conclusions Here, we have presented the results of our study, outlining the changes in public opinion due to the presentation of evidence proving the effectiveness of CTAs during a pandemic. These changes in opinion could prove to governing entities that transparency and informative data have the potential to increase participation with contact tracing in a potential future pandemic. Additionally, it also shows that the public is willing to share geographic information to save others, so long as they are convinced that contact tracking applications are effective and secure enough. Finally, we also proposed three suggestions to improve the adoption rate of contact tracing applications. Hopefully, with these suggestions, the government can respond effectively in a future pandemic and increase the adoption rate for CTAs, saving more lives. J. Cybersecur. Priv. 2023, 3 273 Author Contributions: Conceptualization, K.S.; methodology, K.S.; software, B.A.; formal analysis, K.S. and B.A.; investigation, K.S. and B.A.; resources.; writing—original draft preparation, K.S. and B.A.; writing—K.S.; visualization, K.S. and B.A.; supervision, K.S.; project administration, K.S. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript. Funding: This research received no external funding. Data Availability Statement: We cannot publicly publish the data. 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